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Regulating Heart and Liver
Transplants in Massachusetts: An
Overview of the Report of the Task
Force on Organ Transplantation
by George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
Organ transplantation has been a
favorite topic of health lawyers since
its inception. Organ procurement was
addressed with the adoption of the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act in all
fifty states, and "brain death" has been
recognized both judicially and legisla-
tively across the country. Nonethe-
less, it is now apparent that the major
problems in organ transplantation are
not legal and thus neither are their
solutions. Heart and liver transplants
are extreme and expensive interven-
tions that few individuals can afford
and few hospitals can offer. In an era
of economic scarcity, how (if at all)
should organ transplant procedures
and other extreme and expensive
treatment be introduced into the
health delivery system?
Although it seems reasonable to ex-
pect federal leadership to establish a
limited number of high-quality trans-
plant centers, federal efforts to date
have focused almost exclusively on
trying to help the scattered organ pro-
curement agencies become more effi-
cient. By default, the individual states
have had to develop their own poli-
cies. A number of them, like Califor-
nia and Connecticut, have concen-
trated on Medicaid reimbursement re-
quirements. Ohio has worked to de-
velop a statewide "consortium" ap-
.proach. But until late 1984, only Mas-
Mr. Annas is Utley Professor of Health
Law at Boston University Schools of
Medicine and Public Health, in Bos-
ton, Massachusetts, and Chairman of
the Massachusetts Task Force on Or-
gan Transplantation. © GeorgeJ
Annas 1985.
sachusetts had established a statewide
public task force to make recommen-
dations concerning how heart and
liver transplants should be intro-
duced. The Massachusetts Task Force
grew out of a recommendation, made
by Dr. Harvey V. Fineberg's earlier
Liver Transplantation Task Force, that
The Task Force recom-
mended that the analysis of
priorities begin with the pre-
sumption that all currently
offered health care services
have a higher priority than
organ transplantation.
a broadly based public group examine
the social issues involved with trans-
plantation technology. The Massachu-
setts experience is important not only
because it is the first state to utilize
the strategy of a public task force, but
also because of the strong medical in-
stitutions in Massachusetts, the vigor-
ous use of determination-of-need
mechanisms to regulate the introduc-
tion of liver and heart transplants, and
the almost overwhelming desire of at
least four Boston hospitals to do liver
transplantation and of four Boston
hospitals to do heart transplantation.
Indeed, at times the political aspects
of whether one hospital or more than
one hospital should do either of these
procedures have eclipsed all of the
other critical issues involved in using
these extreme and expensive technol-
ogies.
The complete set of recommenda-
tions, as well as the Task Force's
charge and a description of its proc-
ess, is included in the sections of the
Final Report reproduced in this issue
of Law, Medicine & Health Care. The
recommendations themselves went to
public hearing on November 5, 1984,
and on November 27, 1984, the pol-
icy-making body of the Massachusetts
Department of Public Health, the
Public Health Council, unanimously
adopted the recommendations as offi-
cial Policy Guidelines and used the
Report itself as explanatory text for
the Department in reviewing determi-
nation-of-need applications for organ
transplantation.
Major Conclusions
Although sometimes lost in bland
prose, several significant conclusions
were reached by the Task Force,
which structured its set of recommen-
dations. The basis of the Report can
be stated in one long sentence. Be-
cause transplants are extreme and ex-
pensive procedures that nevertheless
do not cure disease but replace the
patient's underlying disease with a
lifetime of immunosuppression, and
because introducing transplantation
into the current cost-constrained
health care system threatens to dis-
place other, higher priority health
care services (including services to
the Medicaid population and the
poor), transplants should not be per-
formed at all unless they are done on
those who are likely to benefit from
them, unless the total cost is con-
trolled, and unless resources are not
diverted from higher priority care. In
fleshing out this basic principle, the
Task Force concluded that public reg-
ulation would be ineffective if the
burden of proving health care priori-
ties was placed on the Department of
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Public Health. Accordingly, the Task
Force recommended that the analysis
of health care priorities begin with a
presumption that all currently offered
health care services have a higher
priority than organ transplantation.
Therefore, any hospital applying to
perform transplants should have the
burden of demonstrating that "trans-
plantation has a higher priority than
any other currently available health
service from which organ transplanta-
tion diverts funds and/or support sys-
tems."
Limitation is a fair policy so
long as we make transplants
available to all who are clini-
cally suitable in an equitable
manner.
On the underlying value issues of
fairness and equity, the Task Force
concluded that access to a transplant
must be "independent of the individ-
ual's ability to pay for it." Thus, if of-
fered at all in the system, heart and
liver transplants must be considered
part of the "minimum benefit pack-
age" to which all are entitled. But
how could the health care system,
which arguably could not handle or-
gan transplants at all, introduce them
in a manner that would make them
available to everyone? The key is to
restrict the total number of trans-
plants done. However, this must be
accomplished in a manner that optim-
izes the quality of care and benefit of
those procedures actually performed,
eliminates arbitrary patient selection
excluders (such as income, age, and
personal habits), and provides an eq-
uitable manner of selecting among
suitable candidates when not all can
be served. The most crucial element
is to define "cliniical suitability" for
transplantation in a manner that con-
centrates on benefit to the patient in
terms of life style and rehabilitation
rather than simple survival. In the
words of the Task Force, medical suit-
ability should be an attempt to predict
"those who can benefit the most from
[transplants] in terms of probability of
living for a significant period of time
with a reasonable prospect for reha-
bilitation." Critical to maintaining a
strict definition of "clinical suitability"
is the restriction of total system capac-
ity to perform transplants, as ex-
plained in the summary of the eco-
nomics section later in this article.
Application of the Report
The utility of the Task Force Report,
its recommendations, and the new
Policy Guidelines of the Massachu-
setts Department of Public Health
will face their first test when they are
used to determine the public need for
a four-hospital consortium to do heart
transplants in Massachusetts in early
1985. A separate four-hospital consor-
tium was approved to do liver trans-
plants for a three-year period in Janu-
ary 1984. Conditions were placed on
that determination of need, including
requirements that the hospital not
consider ability to pay or insurance
status in patient selection, not reduce
Medicaid services as a trade-off for
liver transplantation, not reduce free
care for non-transplant services below
that provided in the most recent fiscal
year, and have its liver transplantation
protocols reviewed and approved by
an institutional review board. The
Clinical suitability is not an
immutable scientific fact, but
one that is highly influenced
by the environment.
members of the Consortium objected
to these conditions, and appealed
them to the Health Facilities Appeals
Board, which ordered a remand on
procedural grounds. On remand, the
Public Health Council explicitly
adopted the conditions, with some
modifications, over the objections of
the Consortium. The IRB review re-
quirement was modified most signifi-
cantly to read:
The hospital will have its liver
transplant protocols, including
consent and withdrawal of con-
sent policies, organ procurement
policies, recipient selection poli-
cies and confidentiality policies,
reviewed and approved by an
ethics committee of the Boston
Center for Liver Transplantation,
which will contain significant
public representation, or by a
special board set up for this pur-
pose by the Department of Public
Health.
It remains to be seen whether the
Liver Consortium can live up to the
Policy Guidelines. While the hospitals
did not have to satisfy the Guidelines
originally, they will serve as mini-
mum requirements for any renewal of
their DONs two years from now.
Other Sections of the Report
Portions of the Report not included in
this issue are sections on economics,
religious views, and the consortium
approach. The latter two can be dealt
with relatively quickly. The Task
Force found no religious tradition
that prohibited organ donation or
transplantation, and the perspectives
included in the Report from the Cath-
olic, Protestant and Jewish traditions
were all supportive of organ trans-
plants. As previously mentioned, the
consortium approach is primarily a
political issue. It was grafted onto the
original draft of the Report at the re-
quest of the Commissioner of Public
Health. In March 1984, Commissioner
Bailus Walker asked the Task Force's
opinion about the advisability of
granting a temporary exemption from
determination of need to the Brigham
and Women's Hospital, a tertiary care
hospital, to do heart transplants. Such
a single-hospital exemption was seen
as preferable to having multiple hos-
pitals request "emergency waivers"
for individual patients while they pur-
sued an institutional DON (this pro-
cedure was used for liver transplants
in the Commonwealth by the Deacon-
ess Hospital for more than six
months). The Commissioner found it
impossible to refuse such requests,
and the use of emergency waivers in
heart transplantation would have un-
dercut any reasonable planning ef-
forts.
The Commissioner's request for ad-
vice quickly became politicized, and a
loose "consortium" of hospitals was
thrown together to provide an alterna-
tive to the single-hospital exemption.
The Task Force met three times on
this issue. At its final meeting on this
subject, May 15, 1984, the Task Force
appeared for the first time in its en-
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tirety. Following a two-hour discus-
sion, which was highlighted by a
comment from State Senator Ed Burke
that the paper consortium looked
more like a "fig leaf" to cover "naked
rivalry" among the hospitals, rather
than a serious effort at cooperation,
the Task Force voted unanimously to
recommend a DON exemption for
heart transplants in Brigham and
Women's Hospital until the end of
1984. In addition, the Task Force
voted to attempt to develop guide-
lines for a "truly cooperative consor-
tium." A summary of guidelines for a
"worthwhile consortium" appears in
the group's final recommendation.
Economics
Since it was the cost of these extreme
and expensive procedures that ini-
tially led to the formation of the Task
Force, the Report's economic section
and its conclusions are critical to any
understanding of the recommenda-
tions. The analysis describes the many
different ways of determining "costs"
of transplants, and uses the specific
figures generated by various agencies
as examples of how divergent figures
are calculated.
In general, hospitals have used only
direct costs in the figures they have
relied on to support their applications
for determinations of need. Figures
from the Massachusetts Liver Trans-
plantation Task Force and Massachu-
setts Blue Cross, on the other hand,
utilized fully-allocated average costs.
While arguments can be made for
both views, the Task Force decided to
use fully-allocated-average- costs-for-
one-year-of-survival as a benchmark
for determining the cost of transplants
and comparing it to the costs of other
extreme and expensive medical pro-
cedures. In computing the costs of
heart and liver transplants, the cost of
the surgery itself is generally the
smallest item, amounting to only
about five percent of the cost, for ex-
ample, of a liver transplant. About
one-fourth of the cost is attributable
to readmission to the hospital due to
complications, and almost one-half of
the total is attributable to ancillaries
such as laboratory, blood, intravenous
lines, radiology, social work, and
physical therapy. The most important
cost determiners are the number of
ICU days that will be used by the pa-
tient and the cost of these days. Fully
allocated, average costs will be a
function not only of this, but also of
the probability of surviving for one
year and thus using the ICU bed for a
longer period of time (and for addi-
tional years, if we want to arrive at
average total costs).
Using this model, the Task Force
derived costs of $230,000 to $340,000
per liver transplant patient alive at the
end of one year (using a 70 percent
survival rate), and $170,000 to
$200,000 per one-year survival for
heart transplant patients (also using a
70 percent survival rate). Additional
years of survival would acid from
$10,000 to $20,000 in costs per year
to these figures. Compared to other
extreme and expensive medical care
examined by the Task Force (includ-
ing neonatal ICU care, adult ICU care,
end-stage renal disease care, hemo-
philia, bone marrow transplants, and
variceal bleeding) on the basis of
fully-allocated average one-year costs,
the cost of heart and liver transplanta-
tion is 4 to 10 times more expensive
than any of these. That's the bad
news.
The good news is that these proce-
dures can be performed for substan-
tially less than this fully allocated cost
to the health care system at least in a
state like Massachusetts, which uti-
lizes a prospective revenue cap on in-
dividual hospital budgets. Indeed,
this cap on prospective total revenue
may actually make innovation easier
by limiting the costs to the system. A
summary of the argument, which is
the economic underpinning of the
Report, runs like this. First, a signifi-
cant portion of fully allocated costs
goes toward amortization of the phys-
ical plant. Thus, if procedures can be
"squeezed into" existing capacity
without displacing other procedures,
this cost will not have to be borne by
the system. Second, and most impor-
tant, since cost is primarily a function
of ICU days, and since ICU days are a
function of readmission and compli-
cations, the cost will be less if read-
missions can be lowered. This is
likely only if patient selection is kept
very strict, i.e., if transplants are given
to only those patients with strong
clinical suitability, in the sense of
being able to survive the transplant
for a significant period of time with
reasonable prospects for rehabilita-
tion. Thus, cost becomes a function of
patient selection criteria.
In the absence of national
leadership on this subject,
states are forced to make
their individual ways as best
as they can.
Patient selection criteria, however,
tend to expand to include almost
everyone in the absence of restraints
on the system. This was well demon-
strated in the end-stage renal disease
program in which universal entitle-
ment has led to universal treatment,
whether medically beneficial or not.
No one wants to repeat this experi-
ence with heart and liver transplanta-
tion, and thus no national politician
has even suggested that heart and
liver transplants be covered by Medi-
care. Indeed, even though he has
made nationwide appeals for livers
for children, President Ronald Reagan
threatened to veto an organ transplant
bill that would have provided federal
money to pay the $6,000 needed an-
nually for cyclosporin to immunosup-
press transplant recipients, unless this
portion of the bill was deleted-
which it was.
Clinical suitability is not an immut-
able scientific fact, but one that is
highly influenced by the environ-
ment. It is the Task Force's view that
clinical suitability criteria will depend
to some significant degree on system
capacity. Thus, if system capacity is
restricted, the clinical suitability crite-
ria would remain relatively stringent.
This would help insure that only
good candidates received transplants,
and thus that the health care system
would not have to be expanded to ac-
commodate large numbers of pa-
tients. This would, in turn, ensure a
cost-effective transplant program. The
conclusion is that in order to maintain
a cost-effective program, one must
limit volume. And this, of course,
makes determination of need a logi-
cal regulatory mechanism, one in
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which demand is adjusted to system
capacity, rather than system capacity
being adjusted to demand. The chief
architect of this model, and author of
the Economics Section of the Final
Report, is Professor Marc Roberts of
the Harvard School of Public Health.
It should be noted that limitation is
a fair policy so long as we make trans-
plants available in an equitable man-
ner to all who are clinically suitable.
In this way, we can permit organ
transplants to become part of the
"minimum benefit package" for Medi-
care and Medicaid recipients and
even for the uninsured, without
"breaking the bank." A suggested way
to achieve equity of access is outlined
in the Report's section, "Patient Selec-
tion and Rationing Schemes."
Conclusions
Is all this merely an academic exer-
cise? Won't the public demand expan-
sion of the health care system to ac-
commodate all who can obtain any
conceivable benefit from transplants,
no matter what the system costs? Pos-
sibly, but the experience with end-
stage renal disease has been radicaliz-
ing. There are, for example, 80,000
individuals on dialysis in the United
States today, yet only about 7,000, or
less than 10 percent, are on waiting
lists for kidney transplants. Because of
the shortage of available organs, phy-
sicians have determined that more
than 90 percent of all possible kidney
transplant candidates are not "clini-
cally suitable." Capacity of the system
plays a critical role in this, and if we
can directly limit the system's capac-
ity, we not only can limit the system's
costs, but also can provide the service
to those who can benefit the most
from it. A national system which lim-
ited heart and liver transplants to per-
haps 20 high-quality centers is prefer-
able. But in the absence of any na-
tional leadership on this subject,
states will be forced to make their in-
dividual ways as best as they can.
There will be tremendous pressures
on the states from the hospitals, the
media, and the public who cannot un-
derstand why such restrictions on ca-
pacity are being imposed. These pres-
sures may be irresistible. But it may
also be that these pressures can be
resisted, at least during the 3-year
"Phase I" envisioned by the Task
Force, and that after this period of
limited transplantation and data gath-
ering, we will have learned enough
about this issue to be able to make
sound public policy that can be per-
suasively articulated to the public so
that the policy is acceptable. So long
as the entire procedure is public and
perceived as fair, the potential for
regulatory success should not be dis-
counted.
My physician friends are fond of
quoting the following line from Ham-
let in describing organ transplanta-
tion, "Diseases desperate grown by
desperate appliances are relieved, or
not at all." The more appropriate pas-
sage for the regulator appears seven
lines earlier in the King's declaration:
"How dangerous is it that this man
goes loose! Yet must not we put the
strong law on him. He's loved of the
distracted multitude...." (IV.iii) In
this context, the man is organ trans-
plantation. The challenge is to put
"the strong law on him" long enough
to persuade the public that a free-for-
all in organ transplantation is reck-
less, while a controlled system has
pay-offs in terms of quality of care,




Organ transplantation is becoming one of today's thorniest problems for
both individual and institutional health care providers.
To discuss and begin to solve the complex issues, the American Soci-
ety of Law & Medicine is sponsoring, in April, Legal & Ethical Issues
Surrounding Organ Transplantation with the American College of Legal
Medicine and the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute. Seventeen
national organizations, including the American Medical Association, the
American Hospital Association and the American Council on Transplanta-
tion, are cooperating sponsors. The conference will be held April 18-20,
1985, at the Hyatt Regency Crystal City, in Arlington, Virginia.
A special session of the conference will focus on the new legislation
giving the federal government a larger role in the formation of policy
regarding organ transplantation. What does the Organ Transplant and
Procurement Act represent for transplant centers? Who will bear the
burden of financing immunosuppressive outpatient therapy? To what ex-
tent should the federal government implement medical, ethical, and
legal policies on organ transplantation? These and other complex ques-
tions will be probed over three days by an outstanding multidisciplinary
faculty composed of experts in organ transplantation.
Such a gathering of experts is an event worthy of permanent documen-
tation. Therefore, the conference organizers plan to compile a two-vol-
ume textbook that will consist of the proceedings of the conference and
an anthology of previously published articles. The text, which will be
published with the Health Administration Press of the University of Mich-
igan, will disseminate these important discussions to those unable to
attend the conference.
For more information, contact Maureen Shepherd, Conference Regis-
trar, American Society of Law & Medicine, 765 Commonwealth Ave.,
Boston, MA 02215.
